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NATO-Ukraine: the state of relations
After signing the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership (1997), co-operation in politi-
cal, economic, military, scientific issues, as well as in
the field of civil emergency planning and defence
reform was developing at a fast pace. Contacts were
also strengthened in the context of peacekeeping oper-
ations2. 
In the first half of 2002 Ukraine’s contacts with
NATO were on the rise. In March, the Berlin
Conference discussed elements of the new Euro-
Atlantic course of Ukraine. In May, the NATO-
Ukraine Commission meeting in Reykjavik announced
accession to NATO as the goal of the Euro-Atlantic
integration of Ukraine. On May 23, Ukraine’s NSDC
meeting took a decision on the new strategy of
Ukraine’s relations with NATO, and on July 8, 2002,
the President of Ukraine signed a Decree enacting that
decision3. Hence, there are reasons to speak about the
expansion of Ukraine’s contacts with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Meanwhile, the progress and development of those
contacts are in fact a prerogative for representatives of
the higher echelons of state power — a narrow circle
of military and civilian experts. Contacts with NATO
are largely developing “behind the scenes” and are not
accompanied with a broad information campaign,
which in turn explains the low awareness of citizens
about the Alliance’s activities. Only 1.6% of respon-
dents called the level of their knowledge about NATO
high, every fourth — intermediate. Meanwhile, two
thirds of citizens either called their awareness about
NATO low (49.7%), or had no information about the
Alliance (!) whatsoever (19.2%) (Diagram “How do you
assess your level of knowledge regarding NATO
activities?”).
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How do Ukrainian citizens regard NATO? Do they support the idea of Ukraines accession to the Alliance?What is their view of the prospects of the Alliances eastward expansion and Ukraines co-operation with
it? To find the answers to those questions, in June 2002, Razumkov Centre held a sociological survey1. Its
results were presented at the International Conference devoted to the 5th anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine
Charter NATO-Ukraine: Main Achievements and Prospects for Mutual Relations.
How do you assess your level 
of knowledge regarding NATO activities?
% of the polled
Hard to say
3.7%
Intermediate
25.8%
No information 
whatsoever
19.2%
Low
49.7%
High
1.6%
1 The poll was held by Razumkov Centre Sociological Service between June 17-25, 2002, in 24 regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of
Kyiv. 2,006 respondents aged above 18 were polled. Sample error makes 2.3%. Method of polling  personal interview. 
2 For concrete instances of deepening NATO-Ukraine co-operation see the materials presented in this magazine. 
3 Unfortunately, those are restricted documents, which does not help form a consolidated position of the political actors and a wide public in support for
Ukraines integration into NATO. 
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What are the reasons for citizens’ poor knowledge
about the Alliance? First of all, the earlier sociological
surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre showed that
foreign policy issues concerned them far less than the
internal social and economic problems. This seems
natural, given the present situation in the country. 
It would be strange, to say the least, if citizens were
worried about the progress of implementation of the
Partnership for Peace Programme more than about the
rate of unemployment and timely payment of wages
and pensions. Second, the authorities do not care to
spread unbiased and comprehensive information about
the Alliance’s activities. 
In terms of the deficit of information, a significant
share of Ukrainian citizens view NATO under the
influence of either the distorted stereotypes of the past
or the assessments of the Russian media that up until
recently have been far from friendly to the Alliance. 
Therefore, it is no wonder that the public in gener-
al is cautiously sceptical about the present state of
Ukraine’s relations with the Alliance. As one may see in
Diagram “How would you evaluate the present state of
relations between NATO and Ukraine? ”, 37.1% of
respondents termed it as “stagnant”, 18.9% — as
“progressive”. Every twentieth respondent (5.7%)
chose the negative assessment — “deteriorated”. The
greatest share of the polled (38.3%) declined to give an
answer. 
The level of relations with NATO will be determined not
by the scope of pro-NATO rhetoric of the Ukrainian
authorities and repeated mention of the importance of
Euro-Atlantic co-operation but by the diligent everyday
work at approaching the standards of the Alliance.
NATO eastward enlargement
Compared to the previous years, the attitude of
Ukrainians to NATO eastward enlargement is evidently
changing for the better. This is clear from Diagram
“How do you assess the NATO enlargement process?”
which compares the results of three sociological
surveys5. Their correlation demonstrates some showy
trends.
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4 Chaly V. On Some Legal Aspects of Ukraines Integration to NATO.  Zerkalo Nedeli, June 15, 2002, p.3; http://www.uceps.com.ua.
5 Hereinafter we compare the results of the above-mentioned survey and the surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre on May 26 - June 4, 2000, and August
14-23, 2001. 
How would you evaluate the present state 
of relations between NATO and Ukraine?
% of the polled
Stagnant (neither 
progressive nor deteriorating)
37.1%
Progressive
18.9%
Deteriorated
5.7%
Hard to say
38.3%
The Ukrainian visit by a delegation of the North
Atlantic Council led by NATO Secretary General
G.Robertson on July 9-10, 2002, that marked a new
step at rapprochement between NATO and Ukraine,
and the beginning of a full-scale discussion of repre-
sentatives of the Ukrainian authorities, MPs, public
figures and experts with their foreign vis-à-vis about
the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance
may change the situation, if they bring appreciable
results. 
At the same time, it would be premature to draw
the conclusion about a new quality of co-operation. On
the one hand, for the Alliance preoccupied with prepa-
ration for the important Prague summit, the Ukrainian
question is not a priority. On the other hand, for the
Ukrainian initiative of joining NATO to look
convincing in the eyes of its Euro-Atlantic partners, it
should be backed with a number of internal decisions4.
How do you assess the NATO enlargement process?
% of the polled
2000 2001 2002
It is an unfavourable process 
that would strengthen the dependence 
of Ukraine on Western powers
19.6%
15.5%
22.3%
It is an unfavourable process 
as Ukraine could get 
involved in a confrontation 
between Russia and NATO
19.5%
26.2%
9.0%
It is a favourable process 
that would help Ukraine strengthen 
its independence from Russia
It is an unfavourable 
process of strengthening a military 
bloc that could threaten Ukraine
Hard to say
7.3%
7.0%
25.6%
7.8%
7.6%
8.5%
7.0%
27.0%
30.5%
It is a process of strengthening 
the democratic security system 
in Europe, favourable to Ukraine
15.0%
23.6%
21.0%
First of all, in the eyes of the public, the movement
of NATO to the East is no longer perceived as aggres-
sive military expansion threatening Ukraine. While in
August 2001, 50.2% of the polled called the enlarge-
ment of the Alliance an unfavourable development for
Ukraine, for one or another reason, in June, 2002, that
indicator fell to 38.3%. Second, the share of those who
fear that the Alliance’s expansion may get Ukraine
involved in a confrontation between Russia and NATO
fell drastically (almost three-fold!), from 26.2% to 9%.
Therefore, the public fears of being caught between the
Western “hammer” and the Eastern “anvil” sharply
went down. Third, there is an evident (8.6%) increase
in the number of respondents convinced that NATO
enlargement is favourable towards Ukraine’s process of
strengthening the democratic security system in
Europe. Fourth, the fears that the process of NATO
enlargement may increase Ukraine’s dependence on
Western powers somewhat increased (by 6.8%).
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At the same time, the number of those who are
undecided about the Alliance’s movement to the East
increases. Today, Ukrainians are more uncertain and
doubtful about that process than “yesterday” — in
2000-2001, when the negative stereotypes clearly
dominated. 
However, the positive shifts in the views of NATO
enlargement have not yet been transformed into support
for that process. The relative majority of respondents
(41.5%) do not support that process (Diagram 
“Do you support the process of NATO’s eastward
expansion? ”). 
The “Russian factor” has always been present in the
relations between Kyiv and Brussels. Recently, its
influence has been changing. Despite the strongly
negative position of the Russian Federation on the
eastward expansion of the Alliance, the Ukrainian ini-
tiatives of integration into NATO did not especially
irritate official Moscow. The restraint of our northern
neighbour is attributable to the readiness of the Russian
leadership to develop de-politicised, pragmatic co-
operation with the Alliance — in May 2002, a new for-
mat of relations between Russia and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation was approved. 
Russia brings its relations with the Alliance to a new
level, with the help of a new structure — the Russia-
NATO Council, which should ensure: the possibility of
influencing some NATO decisions from within; effec-
tive co-operation at fighting international terrorism;
and the “removal” of possible conflict situations6.
The overall assessment of Russia-NATO relations by
the public logically corresponds to the rather reserved
forecast of the immediate prospects of relations between
the Russian Federation and the Alliance. 28.3% of the
people polled do not expect any significant changes,
roughly as many (27.6%) believe that the relations will
become more friendly (Diagram “How will NATO-
Russia relations evolve within the next five years?”).
NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC FOCUS
Do you support the process of NATO's eastward expansion?
% of the polled
Do not support
41.5%
Support
30.3%
Hard to say 
28.2%
Support was demonstrated by nearly a third of the
polled (30.3%), quite a few respondents (28.2%)
declined to answer. Such a position of the public
cannot be attributed only to the poor information
about the Alliance. Evidently, people are aware that
today, Ukraine lies beyond both the Western and the
Eastern models of military-political integration. Earlier
surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre demonstrated
that Ukrainian citizens were unwilling to join the
Tashkent Treaty, but integration into the Alliance was
also causing doubts.
What does the Alliance, from the Baltic to the Black
Sea, bring to Ukraine? First of all, the process of
enlargement actually coincides in time and space with
the EU transformation — the zone of security, political
and economic stability on the continent is expanding.
Second, the Alliance’s enlargement conditions — its
transformation from a military-political bloc into a
more flexible regional security structure. Third, NATO
enlargement involving the countries neighbouring on
Ukraine will, on the one hand, promote Ukraine’s
interests in the Alliance, while on the other hand, they
will expand the sphere of co-operation with NATO in
terms of geography and quality, and strengthen
Ukraine’s role in the formation of the new European
security architecture.
The Russian factor 
in NATO-Ukraine relations
Ukrainians are split in regards to deepening co-
operation between Russia and NATO, with positive
assessments slightly in the lead (Diagram “Is the deep-
ening of relations between Russia and NATO a positive
or negative process for Ukraine?”). 
Is the deepening of relations between Russia and NATO 
a positive or negative process for Ukraine?
% of the polled
Positive
31.6%
Negative
23.2%
Hard to say
45.2%
Such a picture seems natural, since the efficiency of
a new formula of NATO relations with the Russian
Federation is yet to be tested by time, and pathetic
declarations — backed with practical co-operation
between Russia and the enlarged Alliance. 
6 The attitude of Russians to deepening co-operation with the Alliance looks surprising given the official position of the Russian Federation in not welcoming
NATOs eastward expansion. According to the May (2002) poll held by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Survey, when asked Should Russia seek NATO
membership?, 35% of Russians answered yes and rather yes than no; 47%  no and rather no than yes; 18%  declined to answer. 
How will NATO-Russia 
relations evolve within the next five years?
% of the polled
Relations will 
become more tense
6.8%
Relations will 
become more friendly
Relations will 
not change greatly
28.3%
27.6%
Hard to say
37.3%
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As we already mentioned, Ukraine’s public is now
less concerned that Ukraine may be involved in a
conflict between Russia and NATO. Should this hap-
pen, what should Ukraine do? According to Diagram
“How should Ukraine behave in the event of a conflict
between Russia and NATO?”, every fifth respondent
believes that Ukraine should support Russia. Only 3%
of the polled are sure that they should support the
Alliance.
of NATO?”). The reasons for that are many, and the
experts of Razumkov Centre have already written about
them7. 
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7 Polyakov L., Pashkov Ì. Ukraine-NATO: Warm... Warmer?  Zerkalo Nedeli, May 11, 2002, pp.1,3, http://www.uceps.com.ua.
How should Ukraine behave in the event 
of a conflict between Russia and NATO?
% of the polled
Hard to say
12.6%
Unconditionally 
support Russia
20.8%
Unconditionally 
support NATO
3.0%
Adhere to a strictly 
neutral position
40.7%
Mediate to resolve 
the conflict
22.9%
Meanwhile, the absolute majority of the polled is
sure that Ukraine should not side with anyone in such
a hypothetical conflict: Ukraine should either adhere
to a strictly neutral position (40.7%) or act as media-
tor in the conflict settlement (22.9%). 
The rapprochement between Russia and the Alliance
surely improved the atmosphere in the Ukraine-Russia-
NATO triangle but did not make it cloudless. First of
all, the views of Moscow and Kyiv on the process of
NATO’s eastward expansion are diametrically opposite.
Second, despite all restraint of official Moscow, V.Putin
unequivocally alluded to the “quite possible” parti-
cipation of Ukraine in the Russia-NATO Council, which
hardly complies with Ukraine’s idea of full membership
in the Alliance. One may expect that Russia will press
Ukraine exactly in this sphere. Third, the present
toleration of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet stationing in
Ukraine by Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow in the near
future will inevitably give place to the need of resolving
that problem.
NATO in the eyes of Ukrainian citizens
NATO may be viewed in many different ways, but,
first of all, one cannot but reckon with that most
powerful military-political bloc in the world forming
the core of the European security system, as well as
one cannot stop its eastward expansion. Second,
Ukraine does not have such a high level of
economically and politically beneficial military co-
operation with any other international organisation
(country). Finally, today, there is no reasonable
alternative to deepening co-operation, as was proved
by the experience of Ukraine’s neighbours, including
Russia.
The results of the polls held in 2000-2001 showed
that almost half of Ukrainians had a negative opinion
of the Alliance, seeing it as an aggressive military bloc
(Diagram “In your opinion, what is your first impression
A peacekeeping 
organisation
A defence 
alliance
An aggressive 
military bloc
Hard to say
2002
2001
2000
In your opinion, what is your first impression of NATO?
% of the polled
17.0%
15.8%
17.7%
17.3%
16.5%
24.8%
17.6%
21.5%
34.8%
48.1%
46.2%
22.7%
Does NATO have the right to interfere 
in the internal affairs of non-member states 
for the resolution of humanitarian problems?
% of the polled
Yes, it has
It has such 
a right upon 
a UN mandate
No, it has not
Hard to say
6.2%
11.9%
8.4%
23.1%
26.1%
26.0%
14.1%
6.9%
12.0%
2001
2000
2002
53.6%
56.6%
55.1%
However, the diagram shows a strong positive trend
in the Ukrainian perception of NATO between late 2001
and June, 2002. The number of respondents who view
NATO as an aggressive military bloc fell drastically 
(by 13.3%), compared to 2001; at the same time, the
share of those who see NATO as a defence alliance
noticeably increased (by 7.2%); the number of respon-
dents seeing the Alliance as a peacekeeping organisation
remained stable. Hence, by contrast to the previous years,
now, the share of citizens who have a positive rather than
negative perception of the Alliance is much higher. 
Despite those positive changes, the general attitude
of the public still demonstrates the inertia of the
negative perception of the NATO Balkan campaign.
This deals not with the somewhat specific attitude of
Ukrainians to Yugoslavia but rather with the strong
conviction of the majority of citizens that NATO has
no right whatsoever to interfere with the affairs of
sovereign states even for the solution of humanitarian
problems (Diagram “Does NATO have the right to
interfere in the internal affairs of non-member states for
the resolution of humanitarian problems?”). 
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According to this diagram, the majority of
Ukrainian citizens stick to the opinion that NATO
does not have such a right; only a small share of the
polled abide by the opposite opinion; nearly a quarter
of the polled admit the possibility of interference but
only sanctioned by the UN.
Such views are in line with the hierarchy of organ-
isations called to guarantee security in Europe in the
eyes of the public (Diagram “Which organisation should
be the principal leader in the process of European region-
al security? ”) 
Summing up, it may be stated that the attitude of
Ukrainian citizens to NATO shows positive trends: the
Alliance is now more rarely seen as a belligerent war-
rior. At the same time, the non-admission of NATO
forcible acts is evident. In the future, the attitude of
Ukrainian citizens to the Alliance will probably depend
on the trends in its development and the avoidance of
miscalculations that visibly lowered its authority in the
eyes of Ukraine’s public in the past. 
How to co-operate with NATO?
The partnership with the Alliance promotes
Ukraine’s security, strengthens its position in forma-
tion of the European security system, and promotes
accomplishment of the military reform. There is a huge
potential for co-operation between Kyiv and Brussels
in the defence sector. Ukraine is not a consumer of,
but a potent contributor to stability and security on the
continent. This country has military transport capabil-
ities not available to many NATO member states; it
may greatly contribute to the development of the ABM
system, space technologies, etc. The Ukrainian military
has vast peacekeeping experience. 
It is clear however that the prospects of Ukraine’s
integration into NATO will be determined by its
compliance with not military, but primarily “civilian”
requirements of the Alliance — the first block of the
NATO Membership Action Plan, in particular,
envisages guarantees of the rule of law and human
rights, establishment of democratic civilian control
over the Armed Forces, promotion of stability and
well-being in the applicant country through the
provision of economic liberty and social justice. (Here,
the requirements of NATO and the EU entirely
coincide). 
In this context, deepening of co-operation with
NATO is undoubtedly vital for Ukraine, since it pre-
sumes serious internal transformations necessary for
this country irrespective of the prospects of membership
in the Alliance. 
Demonstratively, the majority of our citizens view
co-operation with NATO exactly under this angle, not
giving preference to khaki-coloured institutions, but
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Which organisation should be the principal leader 
in the process of European regional security?
% of the polled
24.8%
17.0%
OSCE
15.2%
22.2%
EU
31.7%
UN
16.6%
19.9%
Hard 
to say
4.1%
NATO
9.2%
2000
2002
39.3%
As one may see from the diagram, the greater share
of citizens give preference to the UN, leaving NATO
on the bottom of the list. Meanwhile, the assessments
of 2000-2002 show some dynamics. The support for the
UN and OSCE distinctly weakened (by 7.6% and
7.8%, respectively). At the same time, more votes were
given for the EU (7%) and NATO (5.1%). 
To be sure, no country in the world, even the most
powerful one, can guarantee its security relying only on
its own forces. The problem of security is resolved
through participation in the system of regional (global)
security, and reliance on faithful allies who are sure to
come to assistance in the event of aggression. The
Alliance’s members have such guarantees. Non-allied
Ukraine has none. Really, today, the threat of an
external aggression against Ukraine seems hypothetical,
but one should not neglect it. In this respect, the pub-
lic opinion of the possible actions of the Alliance in a
situation critical for Ukraine is of interest (Diagram
“Would NATO defend Ukraine in the event of aggression
or threat of aggression on the part of a foreign country?”). 
According to this diagram, with the steadily low
share of respondents sure of NATO assistance, the share
of those who do not believe in such assistance fell dras-
tically (by 11.2%). By contrast, the number of people
convinced in the assistance of the Alliance on the con-
dition of Ukraine’s membership in NATO increased 
(by 8.6%). Hence, almost half of all citizens believe that
if Ukraine were to join NATO, it would obtain guaran-
tees of assistance in the event of external aggression.
Would NATO defend Ukraine 
in the event of aggression or threat 
of aggression on the part of a foreign country?
% of the polled
Yes, it would defend 
Ukraine in any case
No
Yes, if Ukraine were 
a NATO member
15.1%
19.3%
Hard to say
10.5%
8.9%
36.9%
25.7%
2000
2002
46.1%
37.5%
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first of all — to science and politics8. These views have
been stable for at least the two recent years (Diagram
“Regardless of Ukraine’s intention to join NATO, which
direction of co-operation with NATO should Ukraine
make a priority? ”). 
The greatest share (38.2%) of the polled believes
that the financial burden of co-operation should be
born by the Alliance; a third (33.4%) is sure that the
national security and approach to the Alliance should
be paid for at least on a par with NATO; only a small
share (6.4%) of respondents suggests that those events
should be funded by Ukraine. These figures prove that
the public is aware that Ukraine’s economy immensely
lags behind the powerful economies of the Alliance and
at least for the time being is unable to support on its
own the numerous events held jointly with the Alliance.
It may be assumed that the public opinion on
Ukraine’s co-operation with NATO will largely depend
on the effectiveness of the steps taken by the authorities
for meeting exactly the “civilian” requirements of the
Alliance. Everything will depend on the consistency of
efforts at the reformation of the national economy and
the system of state power; on the effectiveness of dem-
ocratic transformations and consolidation of the funda-
mentals of civil society; on the results of the reform of
the Armed Forces of Ukraine; introduction of civilian
control in the military sector; and, finally, on the degree
of openness and lucidity of the activity of the Ukrainian
authorities on all levels towards fellow citizens and for-
eign partners.
Accession to NATO 
The process of Ukraine’s integration into NATO
will last longer than a year or two. However, given the
need for wide public support for the decision to join
the Alliance, it is highly important to know as soon as
possible, citizens’ answers to this hypothetical referen-
dum on the issue stated below9.
According to Diagram “How would you vote, if a
referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO were held
next Sunday?”, 32% of the polled would vote for
Ukraine’s accession to NATO, 32.2% — against, the
rest either declined to answer (22.1%), or would not
vote at all (13.7%).
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8 It is demonstrative that at present, Ukraines co-operation with NATO develops within the framework of 23 committees, only four of them dealing with mil-
itary problems, the rest  with civilian.
9 Referendum on accession to NATO in the candidate countries is not mandatory for joining the Alliance. If the population sufficiently supports such acces-
sion, the results of public opinion polls may be taken into account. For instance, at the end of June 2002, the head of the Lithuanian Government À.Brazauskas,
expressed doubt about the need for such a referendum, arguing that the results of public opinion polls repeatedly showed that the accession of Lithuania to the
Alliance found the support of nearly 60% of the population, and therefore, there was no need to spend tens of millions of Lits on the event that would only prove
the views of the majority of the population. See: Interfax, June 25, 2002.
Regardless of Ukraine's intention to join NATO, 
which direction of co-operation 
with NATO should Ukraine make a priority?
% of the polled
15.2%
19.5%
Military-technical
21.9%
20.7%
Political
27.8%
27.4%
Scientific
15.3%
11.7%
None
15.8%
15.5%
Hard to say
4.0%
Military
5.2%
2000
2002
Co-operation with NATO encompasses many sec-
tors, e.g.: accomplishment of conversion projects; ser-
vicemen training and retraining; struggle with natural
disasters; improvement of the environmental situation;
and scientific contacts. It develops mainly at the
Alliance’s expense and is surely beneficial for Ukraine.
The public views of the financial side of partner-
ship with the Alliance are presented in the diagram
below. 
At present, Ukraine-NATO co-operative events are mainly 
funded by NATO. Do you think that Ukraine should pay 
for its participation in those events 
or further rely on NATO funding?
% of the polled
Funds should be provided 
on a par by NATO 
countries and Ukraine
33.4%
Hard to say
Funds should be 
mainly provided 
by NATO countries
38.2%
22.0%
Funds should be mainly 
provided by Ukraine
6.4%
How would you vote if a referendum on Ukraine's 
accession to NATO were held next Sunday?
% of the polled
I would abstain
13.7%
Against accession to NATO
32.2%
For accession to NATO 
32.0%
Hard to say
22.1%
How should one assess these results? A third of
votes in favour of accession is a decent figure, to start.
In some of the countries — present candidates for
accession to the Alliance — the level of support at the
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beginning of the road to NATO was roughly the same.
At the same time, it may be assumed that the majority
of those who abstained may join the ranks of adherents
of accession to the Alliance, provided that co-
operation with NATO brings real benefits in the social
and economic sphere.
The attitude to the accession to NATO has distinct
age differences. According to the table, the share of
adherents to the accession goes down with age. The
youngest age group (18-29 years) has the highest
number of adherents, and the lowest number of oppo-
nents to accession — 43.4% ³ 23.6% respectively. 
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youths. They no longer look at NATO through the
prism of the Soviet stereotypes. This is a new genera-
tion of Ukrainians that believes in a united Europe”10. 
Factors of support/non-support for Ukraine’s acces-
sion to NATO. The adherents of accession to NATO
base their choice primarily on geopolitical factors: they
say that accession to NATO would promote Ukraine’s
security, international authority and co-operation with
the countries of Europe and the rest of the world.
Other possible gains included economic benefits of the
accession and the Alliance’s assistance in the reform of
the national army. Strikingly, only 3.2% of the polled
mentioned support for NATO activities as a
motive influencing their choice (Diagram
“What reasons influence your decision concern-
ing Ukraine’s accession to NATO?”).
The majority of the opponents of acces-
sion fear that joining the Alliance will
strengthen Ukraine’s dependence on the
West; they are followed by those who believe
that Ukraine should retain the status of a
non-allied country; quite a few of those
polled pointed to a purely pragmatic issue —
Ukraine’s unreadiness to join NATO.
When should an application for joining the Alliance be
filed, and when will Ukraine be ready for full-scale inte-
gration? These questions were put before the adherents
of Ukraine’s accession to NATO (Diagram “When
should Ukraine file an application to join NATO?” and
“When will Ukraine be ready to join NATO?”)
Almost two thirds of the adherents of accession to the
Alliance are sure that Ukraine should make its intentions
clear and file an application to join NATO either imme-
diately (34%) or in the next 2-3 years (28.7%). Far fewer
people believe that an application should be filed later. 
For accession to NATO 43.4% 34.7% 29.3% 29.8% 21.6%
Against accession to NATO 23.6% 28.2% 32.4% 38.3% 39.7%
Hard to say 21.7% 25.1% 22.2% 18.4% 22.7%
I would abstain 11.3% 12.0% 16.1% 13.5% 16.0%
18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
Age groups
How would you vote if a referendum on Ukraines accession 
to NATO were held next Sunday?
% of the polled
The ratio gradually changes in favour of the
opponents to accession as the populace increases in age
(30-39 years): 34.7% — “for”, and 28.2% — “against”.
The age group of 40-49 years presents a kind of water-
shed: there, the share of opponents prevails: “for” —
29.3%, “against” — 32.4%. In the elderly age groups,
the share of opponents to accession increases. 
Speaking at the conference, Ukraine’s Foreign
Minister A.Zlenko commented on these results as fol-
lows: “...the overwhelming majority of those who gave
their voices in favour of the Alliance were Ukrainian
What reasons influence your decision concerning Ukraine's accession to NATO?*
% of the polled 
I would vote for the accession to NATO because...
% of respondents supporting Ukraine's accession to NATO
I would vote against the accession to NATO because..
% of respondents not supporting Ukraine's accession to NATO
.
Ukraine is not prepared 
to join NATO
25.3%
Ukraine should join the CIS 
collective security treaty
20.7%
I condemn NATO activities 19.3%
Accession to NATO would spoil 
relations with Russia
13.5%
I am unaware 
of NATO activities
8.3%
1.0%
1.5%
Other
Hard to say
Accession to NATO would strengthen 
dependence on Western states
36.5%
Ukraine should retain the status 
of a non-allied country
30.3%
It promotes co-operation with 
European states and other 
countries of the world
Accession is economically 
beneficial for Ukraine
It encourages reform 
of the national army
NATO membership reduces 
Russian influence on Ukraine
I support 
NATO activities
Other
Hard to say
Accession to NATO 
strengthens Ukraine's security
It promotes Ukraine's 
authority in the world
47.7%
24.1%
19.8%
7.2%
3.2%
0.3%
1.2%
49.4%
64.2% 64,2%
* Three options are possible
10 See the address to the Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine A.Zlenko published in this magazine.
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People cautiously assess the level of Ukraine’s
readiness to join the Alliance. Only one in five (19.1%)
polled believe that Ukraine is ready for accession; 
the greater share (39.5%) of respondents gave Ukraine
3-5 years for preparation; another 18.4% is sure that
Ukraine will be ready to join only in 5-10 years. 
Such a reserve in assessments is quite natural, since
NATO is not just a military bloc, and the questions of
political and economic development of the applicant
states are not of secondary importance. As we already
noted, accession to the Alliance in the first place
means compliance with the European social and
economic standards, democratic norms and principles. 
To be sure, the course of Euro-Atlantic integration
cannot be pursued only through political declarations of
the state leaders — consolidation of society and cohe-
sion of efforts of all branches of power are needed.
The position of Ukraine’s new Parliament on Euro-
Atlantic integration will become clear during the
preparation and approval of the new Foreign Policy
Fundamentals of Ukraine. However, it may already be
stated that this Parliament is more inclined to deepen
co-operation with NATO than the previous ones. The
results of questioning party and bloc leaders by
Razumkov Centre on the eve of parliamentary elec-
tions showed that all parties and blocs present in
Parliament (with the exception of CPU) support deep-
ening of contacts between Ukraine and the Alliance11.
The readiness of the new parliament members to
develop co-operation with NATO was also demon-
strated by the heads of the concerned parliamentary
committees speaking at the Conference “NATO-
Ukraine: Main Achievements and Prospects for Mutual
Relations”12. 
At the same time, one should be aware that NATO-
Ukraine partnership is a two-way street. How ready is
NATO to meet Ukraine halfway? Is the Alliance inter-
ested in Ukraine’s accession? More than half (52.2%)
of the polled are sure that NATO is interested in
Ukraine’s membership; the opposite opinion was
expressed by only 13.9%; a third (33.9%) declined to
give an answer (Diagram “Is NATO interested in
Ukraine’s accession to its organisation?”). 
One may agree that NATO is interested in having
Ukraine in its ranks, but this is true for a Ukraine that
is politically and economically stable, with a high level
of democracy and social protection. 
NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC FOCUS
11 See: V.Chaly, Ì.Pashkov. Ukraines Foreign Policy after the Parliamentary Elections: Adjustment Possible?  Zerkalo Nedeli, March 16, 2002, p.5,
http://www.uceps.com.ua.
12 See the addresses by Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee on European Integration B.Tarasyuk and Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Foreign Affairs Committee D.Tabachnyk published in this magazine.
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13.9%
52.2%
33.9%
Regional distribution of assessments
The attitude of people towards NATO and Ukraine’s
co-operation with it significantly varies by region. In the
western regions of Ukraine, the attitude to the Alliance
is generally positive, in the eastern and southern regions
people are more critical. The assessments of respon-
dents in the central regions generally coincide with the
Ukrainian average indicators. 
The regional differences in views may be attributed
to the fact that the Russian-speaking share of the pop-
ulation, dominated by pro-Russian sentiments, is more
dominant in the East and South of Ukraine; there,
border contacts with Russia are stronger, as is Russian
influence. By contrast, in the western regions people
have “pro-Western” sympathies and are traditionally
disposed to contacts with the neighbouring countries —
NATO members or candidates for the Alliance
membership: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Romania.
The maps illustrate the regional differences on the
issues of: perception of NATO, the process of its
enlargement, and deepening of contacts between the
North Atlantic Alliance and Russia. The regional dif-
ferences are especially strong regarding the views of
respondents on the accession to NATO. The West is
clearly dominated by pro-NATO sentiments: 45.4%
(almost half!) of its population would vote for acces-
sion to the Alliance. In the South and East, the pic-
ture is entirely different.
With time, the gap between the West of Ukraine,
on the one hand, and the East and South, on the other
hand, may either widen or narrow. Everything will
depend on whether the people in Lviv, Donetsk and
Odesa feel the concrete results of interaction with the
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* Hereinafter Ukraines territory is broken
down into four regions as follows: the
South  the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, Kherson, Mykolayiv, and Odesa
regions; the Centre  the city of Kyiv,
Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi,
Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia,
and Zhytomyr regions; the West 
Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne,
Ternopil, Transcarpathian, and Volyn regions;
the East  Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk,
Kharkiv, Luhansk and Zaporizhya regions. 
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Alliance members, first of all — in the civilian sectors,
on the condition of better information about the real
gains of such co-operation. 
Conclusions
Today, we witness the process of the formation of
public attitude towards problems of key importance for
Ukraine: how to further co-operate with NATO, and the
question of what will NATO eastward enlargement and
the course towards the accession to the Alliance pro-
claimed by the state leadership bring to Ukraine? The
present controversy and uncertainty of the public are
evidently caused by the complexity of the issue and its
relevance to many external and internal factors, and by
the lack of relevant information.
The results of the performed survey give reason to
state that NATO is losing the traits of an aggressor in
the eyes of the Ukrainian citizens. Positive attitude
towards NATO and support for the idea of Ukraine’s
accession to the Alliance are present in a large share of
the Ukrainian youth. However, Ukrainians are still
becoming increasingly quiet in regards to NATO east-
ward enlargement. The public concern that Ukraine may
get involved in a confrontation between Russia and
NATO has gone down. 
Evidently, the trust in the Alliance will directly
depend on the future path of that organisation and its
ability to avoid the errors and miscalculations that sev-
eral years ago substantially weakened NATO authority
in the eyes of the Ukrainian citizens.
The road to NATO lies through consensus between
all branches of power, consolidation of political forces
and Ukraine’s population, and the formalisation of the
Euro-Atlantic choice in strategic state documents. The
pace of this movement is likely to be determined by a
number of factors. 
On the one hand, this is the consistency and pithi-
ness of Ukraine’s policy towards the Alliance, the readi-
ness of the authorities to perform the necessary internal
transformation and guarantee the transparency of its
policy. On the other hand, this is the readiness of the
renewed Alliance itself to deepen partnership with
Ukraine. The future relations in the NATO-Ukraine-
Russia triangle are not of a secondary importance
either. In this respect it would be very dangerous to
make a fetish of the Euro-Atlantic choice, viewing deep-
ening of contacts with NATO as an alternative to rela-
tions with the Russian Federation. However, interaction
with Brussels according to the Russian scenario will
hardly be productive. 
In the foreseeable future, NATO will form the core
of the European security system, and so this is why
Ukraine is interested in deepening its co-operation with
the Alliance. Approaching the democratic, social and
economic standards of the NATO nations is no less
important. 
To be sure, it is the cohesion of political declarations
and practical steps at the attainment of the mentioned
criteria that will primarily determine the attitude of the
Ukrainian population to the North Atlantic Alliance and
Ukraine’s possible membership in NATO. "
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